Ideia: representação mental; representação abstrata e geral de um objeto ou relação; conceito; juízo; noção; imagem; opinião; maneira de ver; visão; visão aproximada; plano; projeto; intenção; invenção; expediente; lembrança. Dicionário de Língua Portuguesa da Texto Editora
domingo, 6 de novembro de 2016
Lettre du Marquis de Sade à madame de Sade
Le Marquis de Sade, de son vrai nom Donatien Alphonse François de Sade, est un auteur particulièrement célèbre par la dualité entre érotisme et cruauté qui réside dans son œuvre. Libertin assumé, cette lettre nous prouve que le Marquis aimait tout particulièrement son épouse, malgré ses mœurs légères.
Oh ! ma chère amie, quand mon horrible situation cessera-t-elle ? Quand me sortira-t-on, grand dieu ! du tombeau où l’on m’a englouti tout vivant ? Il n’est rien d’égal à l’horreur de mon sort ! rien qui puisse peindre tout ce que je souffre, qui puisse rendre l’inquiétude qui me tourmente et les chagrins qui me dévorent ! Je n’ai ici pour moi que mes larmes et mes cris ; mais qui que ce soit ne les entend… Où est le temps où ma chère amie les partageait ? Aujourd’hui je n’ai plus personne ; il semble que toute la nature soit morte pour moi ! Qui sait si tu reçois seulement mes lettres ? Aucune réponse à la dernière que je t’ai écrit[e] me prouve bien qu’on ne te les donne pas et que c’est pour amuser mon chagrin ou voir ce que je pense qu’on me permet de t’en écrire. Nouveau raffinement inventé sans doute par la rage de celle qui me poursuit ! Qu’augurer de tant de cruauté ? Juge un peu dans quel état ma pauvre tête doit être. Un faible espoir m’a soutenu jusqu’ici, a calmé les premiers moments de mon terrible chagrin : mais tout sert à le détruire et je vois bien, au silence où l’on me laisse et à l’état dans lequel je suis, qu’on ne veut que ma perte. Si c’était pour mon bien, s’y prendrait-on ainsi ? On doit bien sentir que la sévérité que l’on emploie avec moi ne peut que me tourner l’esprit et qu’il n’en peut, par conséquent (à supposer qu’on voulût me conserver), résulter qu’un grand mal. Car je suis bien sûr de ne pas tenir un mois ici sans devenir fou : c’est ce que l’on veut, sans doute, et cela s’accorde à merveille avec les moyens qu’on proposait cet hiver. Ah ! ma chère amie, je ne vois que trop bien mon sort ! Souviens-toi de ce que je t’ai dit quelquefois, que l’on voulait me laisser finir en paix mes cinq ans, et puis… Voilà l’idée qui me tourmente et qui me fait mourir. S’il est en ton pouvoir de me calmer sur cela, fais-le donc, je t’en conjure, car mon état est des plus affreux, et tu en aurais pitié, j’en suis sûr, si tu pouvais le bien comprendre tel qu’il est. Je ne doute pas non plus qu’on ne travaille à vouloir nous séparer ; ce serait là le dernier coup qu’on pourrait me porter, et je n’y survivrais pas, sois-en sûre. Je te conjure de t’y opposer de toutes tes forces et de te bien convaincre que nos enfants en deviendraient les premières victimes ; il n’y a pas d’exemple d’enfants heureux de la mésintelligence de leurs père et mère. Ma chère amie, tu es tout ce qui me reste sur la terre : père, mère, sœur, épouse, amie, tu me tiens lieu de tout, je n’ai que toi ; ne m’abandonne pas, je t’en supplie, que ce ne soit pas de toi que je reçoive le dernier coup de l’infortune.
Est-il possible, si l’on a quelque bon dessein, que l’on ne sente pas qu’on gâte tout par cette punition. Imagine-t-on que le public ira approfondir ? Il dira seulement : Il fallait bien qu’il fût coupable, puisqu’il a été puni. Quand il y a un délit prouvé, on se sert de ces moyens-là, ou pour calmer un parlement, ou pour l’empêcher de prononcer ; mais lorsqu’il est certain qu’il n’y a pas de délit et que le prononcé a été le comble du délire et de la méchanceté, on ne doit pas punir, parce qu’alors on gâte tout le bien qu’on pourrait faire en anéantissant l’arrêt, et l’on prouve clairement que la faveur seule a agi, que le délit a existé, et qu’on a prié le roi de le punir pour éviter que le parlement ne le fît. Or je défie qu’il y ait rien de pis à faire contre moi que cela, c’est me perdre pour toute ma vie ; et ta mère en a eu il y a quelques années un bon exemple, que le militaire et le public ne prenai[en]t jamais le change sur cela et qu’il[s] voyai[en]t toujours du mauvais œil celui qui s’était mis dans le cas de la punition, soit du roi, soit du parlement. Mais voilà comme elle est : lorsqu’il est question d’agir, elle se livre, on la trompe, et on finit par me faire beaucoup plus de mal qu’elle n’avait souvent voulu. C’est l’histoire du Saint-Vincent, dis-lui que je la prie de s’en souvenir ; il y en a quelqu’autre qui joue ici le même rôle et qui n’est même pas difficile à deviner.
Enfin, ma chère amie, tout ce que je te demande en grâce, c’est de m’arracher d’ici le plus tôt possible, à quelques prix que ce soit, car je sens qu’il ne m’est plus possible d’y résister. On te dit que je suis très bien ; ça te calme, à la bonne heure, j’en suis fort aise. Je ne te détromperai pas, parce que ça m’est défendu : voilà tout ce que je te puis dire. Souviens-toi seulement que je n’ai jamais enduré une situation pareille à celle que j’éprouve aujourd’hui et que, dans les circonstances où j’étais, il est infâme à ta mère de m’y avoir fait mettre. Le pauvre avocat qui disait qu’il n’était pas dans la nature d’ajouter chagrin sur chagrin connaissait bien peu ta mère en disant cela. Je t’en supplie, en attendant le jour heureux qui m’affranchira des tourments horribles où je suis plongé, d’obtenir de me venir voir, de m’écrire plus souvent que tu ne fais, de m’obtenir la permission de faire un peu d’exercice après mes repas, chose que tu sais m’être plus nécessaire que la vie même, et de m’envoyer tout de suite ma seconde paire de draps. Voilà sept nuits que je ne ferme pas l’œil et que je vomis pendant la nuit tout ce que j’ai mangé le jour. Tire-moi d’ici, ma bonne amie, tire-m’en, je t’en conjure, car je sens que je meurs à petit feu. Je ne sais pas pourquoi l’on a eu la barbarie de me refuser mon lit de camp ; c’était une faveur bien légère et qui m’aurait au moins procuré la satisfaction d’oublier mes malheurs quelques heures de la nuit. Au moins, envoie-moi mes draps tout de suite, je t’en supplie.
Adieu, ma chère amie, aime-moi autant que je souffre, c’est tout ce que je te demande, et crois que mon désespoir est au comble.
sexta-feira, 4 de novembro de 2016
quinta-feira, 3 de novembro de 2016
Portugal na imprensa estrangeira - "Otro triunfo de la diplomacia portuguesa" - Javier Martín
"Toxic Air – The ‘Invisible Killer’ that Stifles 300 Million Children"
About 300 million children in the world are living in areas with outdoor air so toxic – six or more times higher than international pollution guidelines – that it can cause serious health damage, including harming their brain development.
This shocking finding has just been revealed by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), in a new report — ‘Clear the air for children‘. “Pollutants don’t only harm children’s developing lungs – they can actually cross the blood-brain barrier and permanently damage their developing brains – and, thus, their futures,” UNICEF’s executive director Anthony Lake on Oct 31 said while announcing the report.
“Air pollution is a major contributing factor in the deaths of around 600,000 children under five every year – and it threatens the lives and futures of millions more every day,” he added. “No society can afford to ignore air pollution.”
These findings come a week ahead of the 22nd Conference of the Parties (COP 22) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Marrakesh, Morocco, where UNICEF is calling on world leaders to take urgent action to cut air pollution in their countries.
Using satellite imagery, the report further shows that around two billion children live in areas where outdoor air pollution, caused by factors such as vehicle emissions, heavy use of fossil fuels, dust and burning of waste, exceeds minimum air quality guidelines set by the World Health Organization (WHO).
South Asia has the largest number of children living in these areas, at 620 million, with Africa following with 520 million children, and the East Asia and Pacific region with 450 million children living in areas that exceed guideline limits.
Children Breathe Faster, Take in More Air than Adults
UNICEF further stressed that children are more susceptible than adults to both indoor and outdoor air pollution as their lungs, brains and immune systems are still developing and their respiratory tracks are more permeable.
It added that young children also breathe faster than adults, and take in more air relative to their body weight.
In particular, the most disadvantaged, who already tend to have poorer health and inadequate access to health services, are the most vulnerable to the illnesses caused by polluted air.
The UNICEF report also examines the impact of indoor pollution, commonly caused by the use of fuels like coal and wood for cooking and heating, which mostly affects children in low-income, rural areas.
“Together, outdoor and indoor air pollution are directly linked to pneumonia and other respiratory diseases that account for almost one in 10 under-five deaths, making air pollution one of the leading dangers to children’s health.”
UNICEF further added that it is asking world leaders attending COP 22 to take four urgent steps in their countries to protect children from air pollution, these include: reducing pollution to meet WHO global air quality guidelines; increasing children’s access to health care; minimising children’s exposure to sources of pollution such as by locating sources of pollution such as factories away from schools and playgrounds as well as by use of cleaner cook stoves; and monitoring air pollution.
For its part, the United Nations World Health Organization (WHO) in partnership with the Coalition for Climate and Clean Air (CCAC) and the Government of Norway on Oct 20 launched a global awareness campaign on the dangers of air pollution – especially ‘invisible killers’ such as black carbon, ground-level ozone and methane – for the health of individuals and the planet.
Air Pollution Kills Seven Million People a Year
Titled BreatheLife: Clean air. A healthy future, the campaign aims to mobilise cities and their inhabitants on issues of health and protecting the planet from the effects of air pollution. ‘BreatheLife’ brings together expertise and partners that can tackle both the climate and health impacts of air pollution.
According to WHO, air pollution kills nearly seven million people each year, nearly 12 per cent of deaths worldwide. And it is responsible for 35 per cent of deaths due to lung disease, 27 per cent of deaths from heart disease, 34 per cent of deaths from stroke, and 36 per cent of deaths from lung cancer.
“Urban air pollution levels also tend to be higher in many low and middle-income cities and in poor neighbourhoods of high-income cities. This means reductions in pollutants can have particularly large health benefits for lower income groups as well as for children, elderly, and women.”
The campaign seeks to cut in half the number of deaths from air pollution by 2030 – the target year for the achievement of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2015.
‘Breathe Life’ highlights the practical policies that cities can implement to improve the air quality through better housing, transport infrastructure, managements of waste and energy systems.
It also educates individuals and communities about the measures they can take daily to achieve cleaner air, such as stopping the incineration of waste, development of green spaces and the choice of walking or cycling.
“Improved vehicle standards, prioritization of clean public transport, and the adoption of stoves and more efficient alternative fuel for cooking, lighting and heating are also part of the actions put forward by the campaign the goal of saving more lives and protect the environment.”
For WHO and its partners, this series of measures to achieve a reduction of pollutants could significantly reduce the number of annual deaths from air pollution.
These findings come a week ahead of the 22nd Conference of the Parties (COP 22) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Marrakesh, Morocco, where UNICEF is calling on world leaders to take urgent action to cut air pollution in their countries.
Using satellite imagery, the report further shows that around two billion children live in areas where outdoor air pollution, caused by factors such as vehicle emissions, heavy use of fossil fuels, dust and burning of waste, exceeds minimum air quality guidelines set by the World Health Organization (WHO).
South Asia has the largest number of children living in these areas, at 620 million, with Africa following with 520 million children, and the East Asia and Pacific region with 450 million children living in areas that exceed guideline limits.
Children Breathe Faster, Take in More Air than Adults
UNICEF further stressed that children are more susceptible than adults to both indoor and outdoor air pollution as their lungs, brains and immune systems are still developing and their respiratory tracks are more permeable.
It added that young children also breathe faster than adults, and take in more air relative to their body weight.
In particular, the most disadvantaged, who already tend to have poorer health and inadequate access to health services, are the most vulnerable to the illnesses caused by polluted air.
The UNICEF report also examines the impact of indoor pollution, commonly caused by the use of fuels like coal and wood for cooking and heating, which mostly affects children in low-income, rural areas.
“Together, outdoor and indoor air pollution are directly linked to pneumonia and other respiratory diseases that account for almost one in 10 under-five deaths, making air pollution one of the leading dangers to children’s health.”
UNICEF further added that it is asking world leaders attending COP 22 to take four urgent steps in their countries to protect children from air pollution, these include: reducing pollution to meet WHO global air quality guidelines; increasing children’s access to health care; minimising children’s exposure to sources of pollution such as by locating sources of pollution such as factories away from schools and playgrounds as well as by use of cleaner cook stoves; and monitoring air pollution.
For its part, the United Nations World Health Organization (WHO) in partnership with the Coalition for Climate and Clean Air (CCAC) and the Government of Norway on Oct 20 launched a global awareness campaign on the dangers of air pollution – especially ‘invisible killers’ such as black carbon, ground-level ozone and methane – for the health of individuals and the planet.
Air Pollution Kills Seven Million People a Year
Titled BreatheLife: Clean air. A healthy future, the campaign aims to mobilise cities and their inhabitants on issues of health and protecting the planet from the effects of air pollution. ‘BreatheLife’ brings together expertise and partners that can tackle both the climate and health impacts of air pollution.
According to WHO, air pollution kills nearly seven million people each year, nearly 12 per cent of deaths worldwide. And it is responsible for 35 per cent of deaths due to lung disease, 27 per cent of deaths from heart disease, 34 per cent of deaths from stroke, and 36 per cent of deaths from lung cancer.
“Urban air pollution levels also tend to be higher in many low and middle-income cities and in poor neighbourhoods of high-income cities. This means reductions in pollutants can have particularly large health benefits for lower income groups as well as for children, elderly, and women.”
The campaign seeks to cut in half the number of deaths from air pollution by 2030 – the target year for the achievement of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2015.
‘Breathe Life’ highlights the practical policies that cities can implement to improve the air quality through better housing, transport infrastructure, managements of waste and energy systems.
It also educates individuals and communities about the measures they can take daily to achieve cleaner air, such as stopping the incineration of waste, development of green spaces and the choice of walking or cycling.
“Improved vehicle standards, prioritization of clean public transport, and the adoption of stoves and more efficient alternative fuel for cooking, lighting and heating are also part of the actions put forward by the campaign the goal of saving more lives and protect the environment.”
For WHO and its partners, this series of measures to achieve a reduction of pollutants could significantly reduce the number of annual deaths from air pollution.
quarta-feira, 2 de novembro de 2016
"Variety Endorses Hillary Clinton for President"
terça-feira, 1 de novembro de 2016
"Welcome to the post-post-Soviet era" - Kirill Kobrin
Soviet ideology didn’t so much transform as gradually fade away. After all, ideology is never an add-on – it is something that precedes political practice, defining its direction and discourse. It leaves its print on the slightest gesture by rulers and on every response from the ruled.
The gravediggers of the revolution
Stalin was the first to deal a powerful, effectively fatal blow to Soviet ideology, by turning a series of temporary measures introduced by Lenin into the basis for his permanent internal and external policies. Lenin resorted to terror to win a civil war, so limiting it in time; Stalin introduced permanent terror. Lenin saw the coexistence of a socialist state with a capitalist world as a temporary measure; Stalin reconstituted the historic Russian Empire and played international politics by imperial rules. Lenin was forced to implement his New Economic Policy, recreating a class-based society and labour exploitation; Stalin created a new caste-based society with an enormous material gap between the new elite and the rest of the population, especially workers and peasants.
Lenin, again for tactical reasons, also supported national autonomy movements that destroyed empires; Stalin initiated a nationalist political course – but only for Russians. And in some areas he went further than Lenin: in anti-Semitism, for example, and in an alliance with the semi-official Russian Orthodox Church.
But the crux of the matter was that Stalin, for all the pseudo-Marxist babble of his tame ideologues and the grandiose cult of Lenin, attempted to create a new ideology that was not an ideology at all. It was, instead, a combination of political, socio-economic and cultural instruments, picked out of everyday political practice and given the status of fundamental and unchanging pillars of the “state”. The state was key, for Stalin never saw “society” as something with an independent existence. Stalinism tried, and still tries, to look like an ideology, but in fact you are more likely to find it in a ruler’s travelling bag than a library of political literature. And its ruthlessly practical nature has made it much more hardy and resilient than Marxism-Leninism.
Soviet citizens were offered not “communism”, but “socialism” – again, something previously seen as a temporary, half way stage on the road to a classless society. Communism was talked about endlessly; the ruling party was the “Communist Party”, but from the early 1930s on, behind all the discussion of Marx and Lenin, a system typical of the time was taking shape. For external purposes, it was a superpower dividing the world into spheres of influence with other superpowers; for internal purposes it was a repressive regime where everything was state-owned and evolved social politics were under constant threat.
The following 50 years were devoted to honing these key points, which had no relation to ideology as such. The only blip was Khrushchev’s short-lived but colourful attempt to return the Soviet state and Soviet society to what he saw as real communist ideology. It was this attempt, and not his ridiculous administrative measures and unpredictable behaviour, that was, I believe, the main reason for his fall.
The Brezhnev years were a synthesis of these two previous periods – a combination of (watered down) Stalinist principles and Khrushchev’s basically social democratic measures (a massive housing programme and increase in other social benefits, a more egalitarian wage structure). But the main thing was that in the second half of the 1970s the Brezhnev government quietly dropped any idea of aiming to achieve communism. A new concept of “developed socialism” appeared, to be followed by “the perfecting of developed socialism”.
Anyone who could be bothered thinking about these new slogans would instantly see that the process they described could go on forever. In other words, communism would never happen.
By the beginnings of perestroika, Soviet society had given up on any prospect of communism, so in the early 1980s the idea of a “communist ideology” was also extinct and lay, embalmed in millions of pages of party books and leaflets, in the mausoleum next to its creator. It could have been the final scene from Peter Greenaway’s “The Cook, the Thief, His Wife and Her Lover”. The mummy, however, came in handy during the first years of perestroika.
Stalin was the first to deal a powerful, effectively fatal blow to Soviet ideology, by turning a series of temporary measures introduced by Lenin into the basis for his permanent internal and external policies. Lenin resorted to terror to win a civil war, so limiting it in time; Stalin introduced permanent terror. Lenin saw the coexistence of a socialist state with a capitalist world as a temporary measure; Stalin reconstituted the historic Russian Empire and played international politics by imperial rules. Lenin was forced to implement his New Economic Policy, recreating a class-based society and labour exploitation; Stalin created a new caste-based society with an enormous material gap between the new elite and the rest of the population, especially workers and peasants.
Lenin, again for tactical reasons, also supported national autonomy movements that destroyed empires; Stalin initiated a nationalist political course – but only for Russians. And in some areas he went further than Lenin: in anti-Semitism, for example, and in an alliance with the semi-official Russian Orthodox Church.
But the crux of the matter was that Stalin, for all the pseudo-Marxist babble of his tame ideologues and the grandiose cult of Lenin, attempted to create a new ideology that was not an ideology at all. It was, instead, a combination of political, socio-economic and cultural instruments, picked out of everyday political practice and given the status of fundamental and unchanging pillars of the “state”. The state was key, for Stalin never saw “society” as something with an independent existence. Stalinism tried, and still tries, to look like an ideology, but in fact you are more likely to find it in a ruler’s travelling bag than a library of political literature. And its ruthlessly practical nature has made it much more hardy and resilient than Marxism-Leninism.
Soviet citizens were offered not “communism”, but “socialism” – again, something previously seen as a temporary, half way stage on the road to a classless society. Communism was talked about endlessly; the ruling party was the “Communist Party”, but from the early 1930s on, behind all the discussion of Marx and Lenin, a system typical of the time was taking shape. For external purposes, it was a superpower dividing the world into spheres of influence with other superpowers; for internal purposes it was a repressive regime where everything was state-owned and evolved social politics were under constant threat.
The following 50 years were devoted to honing these key points, which had no relation to ideology as such. The only blip was Khrushchev’s short-lived but colourful attempt to return the Soviet state and Soviet society to what he saw as real communist ideology. It was this attempt, and not his ridiculous administrative measures and unpredictable behaviour, that was, I believe, the main reason for his fall.
The Brezhnev years were a synthesis of these two previous periods – a combination of (watered down) Stalinist principles and Khrushchev’s basically social democratic measures (a massive housing programme and increase in other social benefits, a more egalitarian wage structure). But the main thing was that in the second half of the 1970s the Brezhnev government quietly dropped any idea of aiming to achieve communism. A new concept of “developed socialism” appeared, to be followed by “the perfecting of developed socialism”.
Anyone who could be bothered thinking about these new slogans would instantly see that the process they described could go on forever. In other words, communism would never happen.
By the beginnings of perestroika, Soviet society had given up on any prospect of communism, so in the early 1980s the idea of a “communist ideology” was also extinct and lay, embalmed in millions of pages of party books and leaflets, in the mausoleum next to its creator. It could have been the final scene from Peter Greenaway’s “The Cook, the Thief, His Wife and Her Lover”. The mummy, however, came in handy during the first years of perestroika.
The triumph of PR over ideology
First of all, the legitimate social disaffection of a Soviet population faced with constantly falling living standards was swiftly attributed by the government of the time to “Soviet ideology”, Marxism-Leninism and the idea of communism per se. The “protagonists of perestroika” may have initially demanded that Lenin’s pure doctrines be cleansed of their Stalin-era stains, but this process quickly rebounded on the founder of the Soviet state. The sole beneficiaries of this were nationalist movements within the USSR and the enemies, not of long-dead communism, but of “developed socialism”.
As well the idealistically inclined intelligentsia, who never suspected that they would lose their own social status and way of life along with the Soviet regime, the main players in the perestroika game were the amorphous “petit-bourgeois elements” to whom the begetters of Marxism-Leninism devoted many pages in their works. Eventually, this element merged with a nationalism more typical of the late 19th and first half of the 20th century, and the USSR collapsed.
In most areas of the former USSR, the “post-Soviet project” has been based on these two pillars – nationalism and extreme social egotism, characterised by a surprising blend of embarrassment and awkwardness about their own roots. In the 1990s, both nationalism and extreme individualism bordering on social cynicism were not comme il faut in public life, so fine new, civilised, convincing and right-on expressions had to be coined to distract people’s attention from the only too obvious content of the “post-Soviet project”, and where possible away from the present state of the country and its people.
Therefore the attempts initiated by Yeltsin in the 1990s to formulate ideological reference points on which to build a wonderful new life, proposed something beyond this –across either geographical borders (i.e. the west) or time: “the Russia that we lost” – i.e. 1913, before the revolution. This new ideology was, again, not an ideology at all – it was created post factum to justify the state of affairs at the time.
In the end – in our 21st century – it is not philosophers, historians or even political scientists that have been required for its creation, but “political strategists”, whose job is to foist their political wares on an indifferent, and sometimes hostile, public. This new type of political product is not an ideology, but some kind of ideological sentiment designed to be inculcated in Russians mainly through the medium of images, on either a TV or computer screen.
In other words, any talk of a “revival of Soviet ideology in Russia” is meaningless: like Lenin, it can only be revived in some “Lord of the Rings” - type fantasy. What today can be called an “ideological convention of (late)-Putin rule” is merely a public mood sustained in practice with the aid of PR tricks, an amorphous conservative sentiment carefully extracted from any administrative-governmental or economic sphere of activity (which in Russia amounts to much the same thing).
What we have here is rhetoric worthy of Russia under Nicholas I, Alexander III or Leonid Brezhnev, slightly updated to match the intellectual level of today’s consumers and fed to them in the form of commercial advertising.
In the 1990s, Russia’s “Imperial Bank” commissioned a series of comic TV commercials on historical subjects — with of course, an imperial theme to reflect the bank’s name. Today, this type of advertising, playing with journalism, cinema and literature, is used to advertise the Russian state itself.
First of all, the legitimate social disaffection of a Soviet population faced with constantly falling living standards was swiftly attributed by the government of the time to “Soviet ideology”, Marxism-Leninism and the idea of communism per se. The “protagonists of perestroika” may have initially demanded that Lenin’s pure doctrines be cleansed of their Stalin-era stains, but this process quickly rebounded on the founder of the Soviet state. The sole beneficiaries of this were nationalist movements within the USSR and the enemies, not of long-dead communism, but of “developed socialism”.
As well the idealistically inclined intelligentsia, who never suspected that they would lose their own social status and way of life along with the Soviet regime, the main players in the perestroika game were the amorphous “petit-bourgeois elements” to whom the begetters of Marxism-Leninism devoted many pages in their works. Eventually, this element merged with a nationalism more typical of the late 19th and first half of the 20th century, and the USSR collapsed.
In most areas of the former USSR, the “post-Soviet project” has been based on these two pillars – nationalism and extreme social egotism, characterised by a surprising blend of embarrassment and awkwardness about their own roots. In the 1990s, both nationalism and extreme individualism bordering on social cynicism were not comme il faut in public life, so fine new, civilised, convincing and right-on expressions had to be coined to distract people’s attention from the only too obvious content of the “post-Soviet project”, and where possible away from the present state of the country and its people.
Therefore the attempts initiated by Yeltsin in the 1990s to formulate ideological reference points on which to build a wonderful new life, proposed something beyond this –across either geographical borders (i.e. the west) or time: “the Russia that we lost” – i.e. 1913, before the revolution. This new ideology was, again, not an ideology at all – it was created post factum to justify the state of affairs at the time.
In the end – in our 21st century – it is not philosophers, historians or even political scientists that have been required for its creation, but “political strategists”, whose job is to foist their political wares on an indifferent, and sometimes hostile, public. This new type of political product is not an ideology, but some kind of ideological sentiment designed to be inculcated in Russians mainly through the medium of images, on either a TV or computer screen.
In other words, any talk of a “revival of Soviet ideology in Russia” is meaningless: like Lenin, it can only be revived in some “Lord of the Rings” - type fantasy. What today can be called an “ideological convention of (late)-Putin rule” is merely a public mood sustained in practice with the aid of PR tricks, an amorphous conservative sentiment carefully extracted from any administrative-governmental or economic sphere of activity (which in Russia amounts to much the same thing).
What we have here is rhetoric worthy of Russia under Nicholas I, Alexander III or Leonid Brezhnev, slightly updated to match the intellectual level of today’s consumers and fed to them in the form of commercial advertising.
In the 1990s, Russia’s “Imperial Bank” commissioned a series of comic TV commercials on historical subjects — with of course, an imperial theme to reflect the bank’s name. Today, this type of advertising, playing with journalism, cinema and literature, is used to advertise the Russian state itself.
A new international
There is, however, one problem in the way of the Russian “post-Soviet project” as a distinct historic-ideological period. As I have already pointed out, the common perception of a lack of some all-embracing ideology arose out of a desire to hide the true foundations of the post-Soviet society and state – nationalism and petit-bourgeois elements. But this odd political and public embarrassment about its own appearance is now a thing of the past.
To speak of a lack of ideology is now quite conventional, not just in “wild Russia” but in “enlightened Europe” and all “democratic states”. There is, of course, nothing new in a blend of nationalism and rampant populism: one has only to remember Marx’s classic analysis of this combination in his essay, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon”. This analysis is still considered the foundation of political life in the Western world.
In post-war Europe the ruling elites did all they could to, on the one hand, “educate the common man in humanism” and make him (or her) progressive, tolerant and “open”. Simultaneously, they denied the masses any direct influence on political decision making (they were, not without reason, suspected of entertaining destructive emotions).What we now see in the UK, the USA and some other countries is at once the collapse of the “post-war humanist education of the masses” and a catastrophe for the ruling class.
Nobody is happier to see this than the Russian government and public. When Donald Trump spouts dangerous nonsense of a type that the average American never imagined they would hear in their lifetime; when the British Conservatives continually push the boundaries of good old xenophobia – why do we Russians need to hide the fact that the only things our country and people recognise are perceptions of our own supremacy and our ability to fleece our weaker neighbour?
But there is one serious problem. Both these traits are of no use in relation to the popular issue of our day, national identity, as “foreigners” have them as well. These traits are universal in our modern world, in new and contemporary history. As a result, a new, incredible International of xenophobic “common people” is taking shape before our eyes: an International in which American, British, Czech, Hungarian, Russian, German and many other people are uniting in homespun hatred for one another.
As for the recently so influential neoliberalism, globalism and other powerful theoretical constructs of this fading era, they are already being hastily mummified with the works of economists Hayek and Friedman, to be taken to the same mausoleum where two mummies of communism, the physical and the intellectual, have been lying for over 80 years.
Kirill KobrinThere is, however, one problem in the way of the Russian “post-Soviet project” as a distinct historic-ideological period. As I have already pointed out, the common perception of a lack of some all-embracing ideology arose out of a desire to hide the true foundations of the post-Soviet society and state – nationalism and petit-bourgeois elements. But this odd political and public embarrassment about its own appearance is now a thing of the past.
To speak of a lack of ideology is now quite conventional, not just in “wild Russia” but in “enlightened Europe” and all “democratic states”. There is, of course, nothing new in a blend of nationalism and rampant populism: one has only to remember Marx’s classic analysis of this combination in his essay, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon”. This analysis is still considered the foundation of political life in the Western world.
In post-war Europe the ruling elites did all they could to, on the one hand, “educate the common man in humanism” and make him (or her) progressive, tolerant and “open”. Simultaneously, they denied the masses any direct influence on political decision making (they were, not without reason, suspected of entertaining destructive emotions).What we now see in the UK, the USA and some other countries is at once the collapse of the “post-war humanist education of the masses” and a catastrophe for the ruling class.
Nobody is happier to see this than the Russian government and public. When Donald Trump spouts dangerous nonsense of a type that the average American never imagined they would hear in their lifetime; when the British Conservatives continually push the boundaries of good old xenophobia – why do we Russians need to hide the fact that the only things our country and people recognise are perceptions of our own supremacy and our ability to fleece our weaker neighbour?
But there is one serious problem. Both these traits are of no use in relation to the popular issue of our day, national identity, as “foreigners” have them as well. These traits are universal in our modern world, in new and contemporary history. As a result, a new, incredible International of xenophobic “common people” is taking shape before our eyes: an International in which American, British, Czech, Hungarian, Russian, German and many other people are uniting in homespun hatred for one another.
As for the recently so influential neoliberalism, globalism and other powerful theoretical constructs of this fading era, they are already being hastily mummified with the works of economists Hayek and Friedman, to be taken to the same mausoleum where two mummies of communism, the physical and the intellectual, have been lying for over 80 years.
Lettre de Napoléon à Joséphine de Beauharnais
Le 15 août 1769, naissait le futur Empereur de France, Napoléon Bonaparte. Jeune général de brigade pendant la Révolution Française, il rencontre Joséphine de Beauharnais : commence alors une grande correspondance amoureuse. Le génie militaire, le despote que craignait toute l’Europe y apparaît sous un jour inconnu, tendre et sentimental, aussi hardi qu’absolu : Napoléon l’amoureux.
Tu m’as aimé par un léger caprice ; tu sens déjà combien il serait ridicule qu’il arrête ton cœur. Il me paraît que tu as fait ton choix et que tu sais à qui t’adresser pour me remplacer. Je te souhaite bonheur, si l’inconstance peut en obtenir ; je ne dis pas la perfidie… Tu n’as jamais aimé… J’avais pressé mes opérations ; je te calculais, le 13, à Milan, et tu es encore à Paris. Je rentre dans mon âme ; j’étouffe un sentiment indigne de moi ; et si la gloire ne suffit pas à mon bonheur, elle fournit l’élément de la mort et de l’immortalité… Quant à toi, que mon souvenir ne te soit pas odieux. Mon malheur est de t’avoir peu connue ; le tien, de m’avoir jugé comme les hommes qui t’environnent. Mon cœur ne sentit jamais rien de médiocre… il s’était défendu de l’amour ; tu lui as inspiré une passion sans bornes, une ivresse qui le dégrade. Ta pensée était dans mon âme avant celle de la nature entière ; ton caprice était pour moi une loi sacrée ; pouvoir te voir était mon souverain bonheur ; tu es belle, gracieuse ; ton âme douce et céleste se peint sur ta physionomie. J’adorais tout en toi ; plus naïve, plus jeune, je t’eusse aimée moins.
Tout me plaisait, jusqu’au souvenir de tes erreurs et de la scène affligeante qui précéda de quinze jours notre mariage ; la vertu était pour moi ce que tu faisais ; l’honneur, ce qui te plaisait ; la gloire n’avait d’attrait dans mon cœur que parce qu’elle t’était agréable et flattait ton amour-propre. Ton portrait était toujours sur mon cœur ; jamais une pensée sans le voir et le couvrir de baisers. Toi, tu as laissé mon portrait six mois sans le retirer ; rien ne m’a échappé. Si je continuais, je t’aimerais seul, et de tous les rôles, c’est le seul que je ne puis adopter. Joséphine, tu eusses fait le bonheur d’un homme moins bizarre. Tu as fait mon malheur, je t’en préviens. Je le sentis lorsque mon âme s’engageait, lorsque la tienne gagnait journellement un empire sans bornes et asservissait tous mes sens. Cruelle !!! Pourquoi m’avoir fait espérer un sentiment que tu n’éprouvais pas !!!
Mais le reproche n’est pas digne de moi. Je n’ai jamais cru au bonheur. Tous les jours, la mort voltige autour de moi… La vie vaut-elle la peine de faire tant de bruit !!! Adieu, Joséphine, reste à Paris, ne m’écris plus, et respecte au moins mon asile. Mille poignards déchirent mon cœur ; ne les enfonce pas davantage. Adieu, mon bonheur, ma vie, tout ce qui existait pour moi sur la terre.
B…
Assim vai a Europa! - "Creating child poverty for a whole new generation. Take a bow, Theresa May" - Aditya Chakrabortty
I have seen how the new household benefit cuts will tear poor families apart. Even Margaret Thatcher would have balked at this:
segunda-feira, 31 de outubro de 2016
domingo, 30 de outubro de 2016
"The death of the post-Soviet project in Russia" - Kirill Kobrin
As the end of 2016 looms, you can’t help but look back and discuss what’s happened. You make acerbic jokes about Trump, sigh over Brexit, and hope that Germany’s post-war immunity to brazen populism remains intact. Eventually, it becomes obvious that these topics are, at least, worth discussing — as opposed to the situation in Russia. Russia is boring because, well, everything about Russia is clear.
Having said that, what does “clear” mean? At first glance, the situation in Russia is growing stranger and more dangerous: fairy-tale like parliamentary elections, musical chairs in the government, the bombing of Syria, the death of the liberal opposition, the pathetic helplessness of national legislation when it comes to Chechnya, and so on. Add an economic crisis, growing working class discontent, the slow-motion failure that is “import substitution” — all of this is just the dull background for bigger dramas taking place beyond Russia’s borders. Why? Because all of these unpleasant things have their roots in a previous period of history.
I am convinced that the period of history known as “post-Soviet” in Russia is over. This is why the personalities and processes of the previous period are no longer relevant. They are still in the news, and they still act, sometimes dangerously, but discussing them is as relevant as discussing laws passed by pre-revolutionary premier Pyotr Stolypin in 1919. Today’s changes aren’t as quick and catastrophic as they were then, but then history doesn’t repeat itself, not even as farce.
What has changed? The public agenda. The hierarchy of what’s important and what’s not for Russian society. What is appropriate and desirable. And, most importantly, the project of the present and the past. The old post-Soviet project, once relevant back in 1991, is over. It has achieved its aims. It’s just that nobody’s rushing to pronounce what has happened as the “natural, logical results” of this process.
Maybe now it’s time to sum up (tentatively, of course,) the results of Russia’s post-Soviet project — this is what this series of essays is devoted to. The post-Soviet project began with a public gesture of rejection of Soviet ideology. It ended when it drowned in the pseudo-ideological swamp of conservatism. Ideology, culture, public life in general, these are the things we must concentrate on to understand what happened in 1991-2016.
In this introduction, I will look at the history of Soviet ideology, which was allegedly spurned by the freedom-loving Soviet peoples in the late 1980s, and which supposedly formed the foundation of the “Soviet empire.” In the next part of the series, I will discuss what happened to this ideology, discuss the possibility of new ideologies, and draw some conclusions about the state of the public mind in modern Russian society.
Part one: The portrait of the ideology as a young man
In Arthur Conan Doyle’s story “Silver Blaze,” the ever artless Doctor Watson asks the observant Mr Holmes:
"Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?"
"To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time."
"The dog did nothing in the night-time."
"That was the curious incident.”
If you ask people who were old enough to consciously experience the most impetuous and troubled period of the late Soviet Union — the three and a half months in 1991 between the failed August putsch and the Belavezh Accords — about what role Soviet ideology played back then, they will all answer much in the same way. Soviet ideology played no role. And nobody “did” anything with that ideology in mind.
The object (and content) of political struggle in Russia, Ukraine (which left the Union on 24 August, 1991), Belarus (which did not leave the Union until after Belovezh), Turkmenistan (left 27 October, 1991), Tajikistan (9 September, 1991), Kazakhstan (16 December, 1991) and Kyrgyzstan (31 August, 1991) was the national independence scenario, the status of the republics, the future of the USSR, of how the parent state viewed its surroundings — it had nothing to do with Marxism-Leninism.
On one side of the barricades (thankfully, mostly rhetorical), there were speeches on Russian colonialism, Moscow’s imperial mind-set, and the unmatched qualities of the titular peoples of the respective republics. On the other side, there was talk that Russia “feeds” everyone, and that nations A, B, C and so on never existed to begin with. That these nations were inorganic administrative units, that their languages were just dialects of more important languages, that the great Russian culture far outstretched “local” culture.
This rhetoric is typical for the breakdown of a multi-national empire and the building of ethnic nations grounded in modern realities —you could hear such talk in Hungary in 1848, Poland of 1918, India of 1947 and so on. This is a phenomenon of modernity, of the period which the previous generation of historians called “Modern history”.
The thing is, the fall of the USSR feels like an event from a different epoch. The end of the Soviet Union is seen today as the end of an ideological project, the fall of communist ideology, a postmodern event — most explanations of what happened in 1985-1991 say this.
My task here is not to introduce a new concept of how the USSR fell apart. This is a separate topic of discussion. What I’m interested in is this: how did the “absence” of Soviet ideology in the events of 1991 and, if you think about it, in the events of the previous two-three years, influenced its continuing absence in the 1990s, and how this absence influenced the current Russian regime to remodel (or even reconstruct) this ideology in the last 16 years.
This is no idle question. If dealing with a society that, due to unknown reasons, “lost” an all-powerful ideology, the desire to fill the ideological vacuum is understandable. In that case, the ideology-building of the Putin years acquires the qualities of a natural process.
If there was no viable ideology when the USSR’s allegedly “sudden collapse” took place, then talk of an ensuing “ideological vacuum” in Russia makes no sense. Then we can claim that the post-ideological epoch began on the territory of the former USSR earlier. In this case, it is beneficial to look around Russia, as opposed to peer at its Soviet history — the current happenings in Europe and the US give us much food for thought.
For the 70 years that the Soviet state existed, what was “Soviet ideology?” It’s no secret that, in this case, it is difficult to speak of just one ideology — there were several successive ones that had the same name. The foundation of the history of Soviet ideology is clearly classical Marxism-Leninism, which combined the utopian vision of a future classless society with effective political instruments for practical adaptation.
But unlike the Marxism of the mid-19th century, Marxism-Leninism was not eschatological. Lenin did not prophesise that “history will end” after communism triumphs. The classless society of the future would be created, it was said, and then not only the character of human society would be changed, but human nature.
Lenin avoided futuristic visions, and made do with ascertaining that there will be no class under communism, no exploitation, and no private property, and only that will result in universal justice. Lenin rarely used the word “happiness”, which can be found frequently in the works of the utopian socialists of the 19th century, as well as his romantic contemporaries and allies in the main revolution of the 20th century. The main theory of Marxism-Leninism, the starting point of the history of Soviet ideology, was the idea of universal justice, which was treated as something mystical, even religious, though to Lenin this seem like a practical concept. In order to reach this daring, but, as the Bolsheviks saw, attainable goal, the old world in all of its economic, social, political, and cultural foundations had to be destroyed, so that a new world could be created on a new foundation.
As for the realisation of these aims, each involved a furious debate, but all sides agreed that:
1. The state, being a class-based oppressor, will wither away
2. Property will have universal ownership
3. All people, regardless of provenance, gender and nationality, will be equal and will have equal opportunities
Debates mostly concerned the means of reaching this desired outcome. Lenin’s point of view, which combined the most practical methods with merciless pursuit of the utopian end goal, won out.
Tactically speaking, Lenin was ready to sacrifice a lot. But he never overstated the importance of the transitional measures and institutions that had to be tolerated (or introduced) so the Bolsheviks could retain their grip on power and the country could continue on its path to communism. Peace and trade with the imperialists instead of a global revolution. New Economic Policy, or NEP. Giving land to peasants for individual use. Using “fellow travellers” in science, industry, and culture (or propaganda, to be exact), in the government apparatus and in the army. Finally, there was the recognition of national movements as “revolutionary allies”, with all of the conclusions for policy this entailed.
If we look at “Soviet ideology” circa 1984, right before the beginning of perestroika, we will see that pretty much nothing of Marxism-Leninism remained. Soviet ideology had undergone a grandiose transformation. The principal loss during 70 years of Soviet rule was the idea of creating an absolutely just society — this was why the state and its citizens existed, after all.
And this idea was lost long before the Soviet Union was also “lost”.
Kiril Kobrin
sexta-feira, 28 de outubro de 2016
"Reexamining History with Noam Chomsky: New World Order & the Grand Area"
- How did the US establishment view fascist figures such as Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini before the global war began?
- Was the US complicit or did it actively support fascism in Europe?
- What geopolitical plans did the United States draw for the globe before World War II?
- What is the “Grand Area” and how did it effect the security and economy of the globe?
- How did countries such as Italy, Germany and Greece fit into this scheme and why did the US crush anti-fascist movements across Europe?
"Three Threats to China’s Economy" - Zhang Jun
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